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Abstract 
Transboundary river basins are of immense economic and environmental importance 
but their management constitutes a vexing international problem. While supply is 
constant, human activity and changing environmental conditions lead to the decline of 
global water availability. Scarcity and changes in resource accessibility are likely to 
spur conflict between partners to a shared system. Therefore, international institutions 
and agreements, able to adapt to changing circumstances will prove to be essential. 
Regarding the flexibility of international water agreements, mechanisms to address 
conflict (CRM) have been defined as particularly important by numerous scholars in 
the field. But despite the fact that a better understanding of CRM-use could provide 
key insights about costs and benefits, there has been no systematic study of CRM 
appearance in international treaties or the conditions that affect their choice.  
This study therefore analyzes the content of a large number of water treaties and 
examines which mechanisms are adopted under what conditions. First, we distinguish 
4 types of conflict resolution (“negotiation”, “mediation”, “arbitration” and 
“adjudication”). Consequently we build up a theoretical framework covering the 
expected relations between the transaction costs of CRM, the proxies to assess them 
(independent variables) and conflict resolution adoption (dependent variables). 
Eventually, a multivariate regression of the available data will allow us to draw 
conclusions about the appearance of CRM in international water agreements. So far, 
our results indicate that, although conflict resolution is considered important, still 45 
per cent of the sampled treaties lack such provision. Multilateral agreements, 
however, are more likely to contain CRM. Most agreements do not specify the 
activation procedure of the mechanism or how to bear the cost of its use. By means of 
this research we aim to offer policy makers a guide for negotiating environmental 
agreements. 
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Transboundary river basins are of immense global economic and environmental 
importance but their protection and management constitutes a vexing international 
problem. Global water availability is in decline due to growing demand (Hayton & 
Utton, 1989; Falkenmark, 1990; Yoffe et al, 1993; Fuwa, 2003; UNDP, 2006; Dinar 
et al. 2007; Bernauer & Kalbhenn, 2010), unsustainable water management practices 
(Bernauer&Kalbhenn, 2010) and changing environmental conditions (Eea, 2007; 
IPCC, 2007; IWMI, 2006; Gleick 1993; UNDP, 2006; TEC, 2007; World Bank, 
2009). Increased pressure on global water supply, together with new water uses and 
allocation patterns can easily induce friction over this scarce resource (Homer-Dixon, 
1991). The more, considering the fact that the majority of the world’s countries have 
some portion of their territory in an international basin (UNDP, 2006; Conca, 2006), 
while a growing percentage of the human population directly depends upon water that 
originates outside of their borders (Ohlsson, 1995; Falkenmark and Lundqvist, 1995; 
Frederick, 1996; UNESCO, 2005), it is obvious that withdrawals from one country 
can drain life-giving water from a neighbouring country and as such become a source 
of interstate conflict (Hayton & Utton, 1989; Homer Dixon & Percival; 1997; Toset et 
al., 2000; PCCP, 2002; Nordas et al., 2007).  
 
This continuous pressure on water resources poses exceptional institutional and 
collective action problems, especially because freshwater systems ignore political, 
administrative and legal boundaries Gerlak et al., 2010). Bernauer and Kalbhenn 
(2010) found that growing water scarcity combined with weak institutional 
arrangements and the absence of international water treaties are key-factors for 
spurring conflict. The design of more appropriate interstate treaties could therefore be 
an effective way of trying to avoid future disputes between states (Ohlsson, 1995; 
Swain, 2001; Postel & Wolf, 2001; Hensel et al., 2006; Conca, 2006). As the FAO 
index of international water agreements indicates, in the past countries already 
resorted to treaties in an attempt to address uncertainty about the value and utilization 
of shared resources (Ohlsson, 1995; PCCP, 2002; Bernauer, 2002; Espey and 
Towfique, 2004; Bernauer & Kalbhenn, 2010). The agreement may be watercourse 
specific (e.g. the 1961 Columbia River Treaty), an umbrella agreement regulating 
regional waters (e.g. 1992 Helsinki Convention on Transboundary Watercourses) or 
an instrument for conflict resolution of the “friendly relations between neighboring 
states” (PCCP, 2002).  
 
However, treaties, as they exist today, may prove to be inept to address future 
conflicts if water becomes scarce (IPCC, 2001; Nordas, 2007). While it may form the 
basis for the initial watercourse regime, issues related to its implementation, such as 
changed water supply or demand, may lead to conflict (PCCP, 2002; Ostrom, 2005). 
Hence, numerous scholars acknowledged conflict resolution mechanisms (CRM)3 as 
particularly important elements to water treaties (Rogers and Hall, 2003; Conca, 
2006; Wolf, 2007; Bernauer and Kalbhenn, 2008; Dinar et al., 2008; Gerlak et al. 
2010). Yet, even after repeated demands for more detailed dispute resolution 
procedures in the past (Caldwell, 1984; Hayton & Utton, 1989; UNEP, 2002), little 
progress has been made so far (Pacific Institute, 2009).  
 
Besides the worrying fact that conflict resolution in transboundary water agreements 
is either absent or unsophisticated (Goldenman, 1990, Hamner & Wolf, 1998; 
                                                
3 Conflict resolution mechanisms, hereafter often referred to as CRM 
Fischhendler, 2004; Boockmann & Thurner 2006, Drieschova et al., 2008), no 
systematic efforts have been undertaken to identify the mechanisms that are available 
and the ones that are actually adopted. While there is a considerable amount of 
literature on the subject of conflict and cooperation in international water 
management, conflict resolution as a concept has so far only been defined vaguely by 
Durth (1996), Marty (2001) or Wolf (1997) (Bernauer, 2002). The more, the subject 
has generally been considered as a single issue in the past (Koppel, 2009), although 
we know that a variety of such mechanisms exist.  
 
Our study aims to partially fill this gap by addressing key questions about conflict 
resolution and its appearance in international agreements. First, we identify the main 
categories of such mechanisms, based on review of the available literature on the 
subject. However, a gap between the mechanisms available and the ones actually 
adopted leads us to the assumption that conflict resolution comes at a cost, we will 
take a closer look at the phenomenon of transaction costs. After briefly lining out the 
methodology, we therefore take a closer look at the phenomenon of transaction costs 
and aim to build up a theoretical framework capturing the expected relations between 
costs, the proxies to assess them and their influence on the adoption and appearance 
of CRM. Finally, a multivariate regression and analysis of the data will provide the 
results of our research. Through this work we hope to gain a better understanding of 
what affects the use of conflict resolution in international water agreements.  
It should be noted that this paper summarises an ongoing research project and is 
therefore a piece of work in progress. This implies that much of the data still needs to 
be collected. Accordingly, the result section is rather meant to illustrate some of the 
implications of the theoretical framework.  
 2. The CRM available 
The distinction of CRM in our study is based upon the literature which usually 
identifies four main types of conflict resolution ranging from soft law to hard law 
mechanisms (Wolf, 1997; Foley, 2007; Emerson et al., 2003). This includes 
negotiation, mediation, arbitration and adjudication. Each of these mechanisms is 
characterized by a different nature and role of a third party.  
“Nature” implies that conflict resolution can either be “competitive” and rights-based 
or “cooperative” and interest-based. A competitive mechanism is generally 
adversarial and induces win-lose situations, while cooperative mechanisms tend to 
stimulate direct communication and generate win-win outcomes (Deutsch, 1983; 
Schellenberg, 1996; Brown&Marriot, 1999; Liebman, 2000; Goldberg, 2003; Leb, 
2003; Spangler, 2003). The role of a third party implies the intervention of 
mediators, joint commissions, arbitrators or judicial courts in the process. Along the 
line of Oran Young’s study (1972), we distinguish between “passive and informal” 
third parties, with limited intervening power and “active and formal” third parties, 
with the authority to issue formal statements or impose solutions.  
 
2.1 A classification of the available conflict resolution mechanisms 
A first type of conflict resolution is negotiation, a process through which disputants 
voluntarily work out an agreement between themselves, while aiming to satisfy the 
interests of each of the factions involved (McCool, 1993; Schellenberg, 1996). 
Negotiation can be direct between parties or representative through agents, diplomats 
or experts. However, it never assumes a third party (Merills, 1984; Stewart, 1989). 
Direct negotiation is referred to as consultation, while representative negotiation 
refers to a joint and institutionalised commission. Importantly, such a commission 
does not dispose of any formal decision-making power, for in so having, it would be 
assuming an arbitral function (Probst, 1989). An example is the 1909 International 
Joint Commission between Canada and the U.S  (Alpher & Monahan, 1986). In some 
cases, the treaty does not specify in which form negotiation should take place. 
 
The second mechanism is mediation, which prescribes the intervention of an 
independent third party. It is a cooperative and interest-based process in the sense that 
disputants as well as third parties try to look for common grounds and a 
compromising solution (Young, 1972; Stewart, 1998; Liebman, 2000). We distinguish 
two types, according to the level of authority disputants wish to assign to a third 
party: the practice of good offices is hardly interventionist and merely offers a 
temporary and alternative gateway for communication (Merills, 1984) while 
conciliation is semi-institutionalised. The latter normally assumes the assignment of 
long-term experts or commissions that are required to intervene every time a dispute 
arises (Probst, 1989). None of the above procedures have the power to issue binding 
solutions. However, as with negotiation, it can be that the form of mediation is left 
unspecified by the treaty. 
 
Yet, even experienced diplomats and mediators know that also institutionalised best 
efforts to contain disagreement may eventually fail (Hayton & Utton, 1989), creating 
the need for more rigorous and formal conflict resolution such as arbitration and 
adjudication. Arbitration is fundamentally competitive and rights-based since a third 
party determines directly the winner and loser in relation to the rights and wrongs of a 
dispute. A decision issued by an arbitrational tribunal can therefore be binding. The 
process contains some of the same elements as adjudication, however, while the latter 
takes place in an established court, arbitration requires the parties themselves to set up 
the machinery for handling a dispute or a series of disputes (Merills, 1984; Stewart, 
1998, Goldberg et al., 2003). Finally, adjudication or litigation indicates a process 
where a dispute is settled in court, according to legal statutes and with advocates 
presenting evidence on behalf of the parties (Liebman, 2000). The process is 
adversarial and rights-based and can take place on a domestic or international level 
(Stewart, 1998; Spangler, 2003; Chatterjee and Lefcovitch, 2008). States can agree by 
treaty to delegate some decision-making power over water related issues to domestic 
courts, yet, referring disputes, upon consensus, to the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) is the more common practice in the field. Both types of court decisions can be 
binding, although in the case of the ICJ, no enforcement mechanisms exist to back up 
the court’s decisions (Wolf, 1997).  
Table 1 presents the differentiation of mechanisms. 
Table 1: Conflict resolution mechanisms 
Conflict Resolution Mechanism Sub-Mechanism Nature Third Party 
Consultation Cooperative Absent 
Joint Commission of Representatives Cooperative Absent 
Negotiation 
Unspecified  Cooperative  Absent 
Good Offices Cooperative Passive and informal 
Conciliation  Cooperative Passive and informal 
Independent Commission Cooperative Passive and informal 
Mediation 
Unspecified Cooperative Passive and informal 
Not permanent tribunal or board Competitive Active and formal Arbitration 
Permanent arbitration Competitive Active and formal 
Domestic Court Competitive Active and formal Adjudication 




To ascertain whether and how conflict resolution is applied in water treaties, we 
conducted a content analysis of the available transboundary water treaties.  The unit 
of analysis is the treaty4 for which the most comprehensive source is the recently 
expanded Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD), listing a total of 679 
agreements. The treaties were selected randomly and included only primary 
agreements, substitutes of former (primary) agreements, exchanges of notes, 
conventions and protocols to agreements, all of which full or substantial text is 
available. All were written in - or translated into - English or French5. The first 
agreement in the sample dates from 1857 while the last was signed in 2004. Only two 
of the hundred treaties in the sample were general conventions rather than basin 
specific treaties. In a first stage we run a trial of 100 treaties, which allows us to test 
and adjust our theoretical framework. In a second stage we review all the agreements 
that respond to the above requirements and that are available in the TFDD.  
Consequently, the treaty content was read and analyzed first for reference to conflict 
resolution, second for the type of mechanism used. A theoretical framework 
combining the proxies for cost-assessment with the dependent variables allows us to 
formulate a set of hypothesises. Finally, a multivariate regression analysis will 
provide us with the results of our research. 
 
4. Dependent Variables 
Our main dependent variable throughout the research is the type and number of 
conflict resolution mechanisms in a treaty. Others include the place of the 
mechanism in the treaty (“the preamble”, “the treaty body”, “the annexes” or “more 
parts”), the condition in which it is supposed to be used (when there is a “breach” 
                                                
4 Defined in accordance with the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties of 1969 as “an 
international agreement concluded between states in written form and governed by 
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument of in two or more related 
instruments and whatever its particular designation” (Vienna Convention, 1969, Art.2). 
5 With two or three exceptions of treaties in Italian and Dutch 
of the agreement, when there is an argument about the “interpretation or application” 
of the treaty terms, by “periodical review”, because of a “change in physical 
conditions” and finally under “other” or “unspecified” circumstances), the activation 
procedure (“unilaterally”, “consensus”, “voting”, “majority vote”, “issue is ignored”) 
and the cost sharing method (the treaty applies the “polluter pays”-principle, the 
costs are “equally divided” or covered by a “third party”, the “beneficiary pays” or 
the issue is left “ignored”). Another important aspect we looked at is the issue area to 
which the mechanism applies and whether the scope of the CRM was specified.  
Consequently we examined whether the mechanism applied to all issues of the treaty 
or to one in specific, for example, navigation. The different issue areas are taken from 
the TFDD and include: border issues, economic development, fishing, flood control, 
hydropower, infrastructure/development, irrigation, joint management, navigation, 
technical cooperation, territorial issues, water quality and water quantity.  
Finally, two additional dependent variables relating to the institutionalisation and the 
maturity of a CRM were composed. Institutionalised conflict resolution includes a 
commission (negotiation or mediation), a permanent tribunal (arbitration), domestic 
courts and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (adjudication). Maturity is captured 
by five of the variables mentioned above (the condition of mechanism use, the 
activation procedure, the cost sharing method, the issue area and institutionalisation). 
Depending on whether the specific values of these variables are expected to enhance 
or decrease mechanism maturity we codified them either “0” or “1”, the latter 
representing a higher level of maturity. An average of the codes finally determines 
mechanism maturity. Each treaty in our sample will be read, categorised and codified 
according to the table below. 
 
Table 2: Dependent variables 
Variables Values 
1. Type of CRM Negotiation (consultation, commission of representatives, 
unspecified),  
Mediation (good offices, conciliation, independent 
commission, unspecified), Arbitration (not permanent, 
permanent) Adjudication (domestic court, ICJ) 
2. Number of CRM Lower number of CRM: {0, 1}  
Higher number of CRM: {2, 3-4, +4}  
3. Place of the CRM in the treaty Preamble, treaty body, annex 
4. Condition of use Breach, interpretation/application, periodical review, change 
in physical conditions, failure of a previous mechanism, issue 
ignored 
5. Activation procedure Unilaterally, majority, consensus, issue ignored 
6. Cost-Sharing method Polluter pays, equally divided, third party, beneficiary pays, 
issue ignored 
7. Issue Area Single issue, Multiple issues 
8. Institutionalisation Institutionalised (Joint commission of representatives, 
Independent commission, permanent arbitration, domestic 
court, ICJ),  
Not Institutionalised (consultation, unspecified form of 
negotiation, good offices, unspecified form of mediation, no 
permanent arbitration) 
9. Maturity Averaged value of:  
a) Condition of use: issue ignored (0), other categories:  (1) 
b) Activation procedure: unilaterally, issue ignored (0), other 
categories (1) 
c) Cost sharing: issue ignored (0), other categories (1) 
d) Issue area: single issue (0), multiple issues (1) 
e) Institutionalisation: not institutionalised (0), 
institutionalised (1) 
 {a+b+c+d+e} / 5 = value between 0-1 with: 
Immature CRM: 0.00-0.49 
Mature CRM: 0.50-1.00 
 
5. What affects the choice of CRM: a transaction cost approach 
In this section we review the expected costs of CRM and hypothesise how this 
potentially determines the adoption of conflict resolution.  
The origins and application of the transaction cost (also TC) theorem are based 
mainly on the findings of Ronald Coase, a British economist who stated that:  
 “In order to carry out a transaction it is necessary to know what we are dealing 
with and on what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw 
up a contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure the terms of the 
contract are being observed and so on.” 
 
These actions, however, are potentially very costly and often sufficiently costly as to 
prevent a transaction of taking place (Coase, 1970; Kesting, 2007). When it comes to 
dispute resolution, the main question remains on how conflict can be solved in a low-
cost way since lower costs are believed to stimulate the adoption of CRM (Libecap, 
1995; Streit, 1998; Bernauer, 2002; Rao, 2003). Moreover, if transaction costs are too 
high, parties will not even bother to negotiate (Gilligan, 2003)6.  
 
Along the line of general distinctions made in transaction cost (TC) literature, we 
distinguish between political costs (ex ante) attached to the establishment of a 
mechanism on one hand, and monitoring and enforcement costs (ex post), brought 
about by the operation of a mechanism on the other (Coase, 1970; Williamson, 1985). 
In what follows below we discuss each of the different cost elements together with the 
proxies to assess them. A table at the end of this chapter summarises the entire 
theoretical framework. This paper does not allow for a detailed discussion of the 
costs’ assessment, yet, more information on this issue can be requested from the 
author. 
 
 5.1 Political Costs 
In this section we examine the main elements of the political cost. It is important to 
note that the two sets of cost elements (ex ante and ex post) are usually 
interdependent, hence an attempt to minimise one set of TC will have a corresponding 
effect on the entire cost frame (Rao, 2003). The following distinction is based upon 
earlier work of Coase (1937), Williamson (1985), Hodgson (1988), Levi (1988), 
Ostrom et all. (1993), Furubotn and Richter (2000) and Rao (2003) and lists 
respectively uncertainty costs, bargaining costs, sovereignty costs, and related to the 
issue of common pool resources, resource availability costs.  
 
 
                                                
6 It needs to be stressed that the concern lies not with the absolute level of costs, which would 
hardly allow for absolute quantification, but rather with the relative differences between 
them (Gilligan, 2003; Kesting, 2007). 
5.1.1 Uncertainty Costs 
Negotiations usually take place under conditions of considerable complexity and 
uncertainty, and it is not economical for the parties to specify in advance how they 
ought to behave under every conceivable contingency (Schwartz and Sykes, 2002). In 
the line of game theory and based on Barrett’s (2003) findings about the relation 
between a growing number of players and an enhanced risk of dispute, we identify the 
number of signatories as the main factor that fuels this cost. Consequently, a shift 
from bilateral to multilateral treaties is expected to increase the uncertainty and hence 
the transaction cost (Gilligan, 2003), what we expect to be addressed by a higher 
number of CRM per treaty. 
 
However, uncertainty costs are also often associated with information costs. This 
concerns uncertainty about scientific knowledge (Ostrom et all. 1993), how this will 
affect parties’ preferences (Hipel et all, 2004) and the context of the resource (Ostrom 
et al., 1993). Kasper and Streit (1998) argue that costs induced by the lack of 
information can be kept relatively low if there is a possibility to extrapolate from past 
experiences or analogue cases, thereby avoiding innovation (Hodgson, 1988). 
Following this reasoning, it is useful to organise parties under a same institutional 
umbrella as to increase the availability of information while preventing the costs of 
creating new rules (Axelrod, 1984; Keohane, 1984; Young, 1989; Keohane and 
Ostrom, 1995; Gilligan, 2003; Conca, 2006). The above leads us to the following 
assumption: 
Hypotheses 1: “The higher the number of parties, the more likely a treaty will be 
associated with higher uncertainty costs, hence we expect a higher number of CRM in 
a more institutionalised form” 
5.1.2 Bargaining Costs 
Bargaining costs relate to the outlays that must be made when parties have to decide 
upon an institutional arrangement. One of the main components of such costs is the 
amount of time that is necessary to come to a consensus (Williamson, 1970; Furubotn 
and Richter, 2000). When parties differ substantially with regards to their preferences, 
resources and information, more time and effort will be required to come to a 
consensus (Ostrom et al., 1993). Eventually, this cost-provoking effect becomes even 
stronger when the number of signatories grows (Lindemann, 2005).  
On the other hand, institutionalised procedures and the adoption of mature CRM’s are 
expected to effectively reduce the costs of future transactions (Susskind, 1994; Kasper 
and Streit, 1998; Gilligan, 2003; Maitland et al., 2009). Also, when third parties have 
the authority to issue binding resolutions, bargaining costs can be kept low.  
 
In addition, when parties have the same expectations and preferences, transaction 
costs are expected to drop (Shirley, 2003). Consequently, we assess the homogeneity 
in parties’ preferences by looking at the compatibility of political systems and the 
level of trust between them. Politically compatible countries, and politically stable 
countries in particular, may be deterred from involvement with states that find 
themselves in a political turmoil or that are institutionally weaker. Besides the fact 
that democracies are believed to be more politically stable and committed to solving 
common transboundary problems (Kalbhenn; 2007), they also tend to interact more 
than autocracies (Milner, 1997). For this last reason, we expect democratic states to 
engage more in cooperative processes of conflict resolution (negotiation and 
mediation). Based on the above we can formulate the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2a: “When signatories are more democratic, we expect lower bargaining 
costs and hence a lower number of CRM per treaty, together with more negotiation 
and meditation mechanisms” 
Hypothesis 2b: “When signatories have incompatible political systems, we expect a 
higher number of CRM per treaty” 
 
Concerning the level of trust, we look at the history of interstate militarised dispute 
and the diplomatic relations for the year in which the treaty was signed. Following the 
reasoning that parties with cooperative, trustful relations, generally feel less need to 
adopt conflict resolution and/or to specify its terms of use, we expect parties with 
trustful relations to adopt less mature CRM.  
Hypothesis 3: “The higher the level of trust between parties, the lower the bargaining 
costs, hence we expect an immature CRM” 
 
5.1.3 Sovereignty Costs 
Concerns over sovereignty have strong effects on state preferences, particularly with 
regards to the sum of decision-making power they are willing to hand over to 
international or supranational institutions. The traditional model of dispute resolution 
places total control by states at one end of a continuum (Keohane et al., 2000) while 
one the other end highly legalistic dispute settlement mechanisms transfer the entire 
policy-making authority to international institutions (Buhr, 2005). We argue that 
particularly the level of trust affects this cost.  
When parties share trustful relations, sovereignty costs are low, inducing the 
preference for interstate negotiation (Carroll, 1988; Keohane et al., 2000). 
Furthermore, Benevenisti (1996) adds that in case states’ relationship is characterised 
by distrust, they are more likely to introduce the requirement of consensus regarding 
the activation of CRM.  
Hypothesis 4a: “The higher the level of trust, the lower the sovereignty cost, hence we 
expect the CRM to be negotiation and mediation” 
Hypothesis 4b: “The lower the level of trust between parties, the more we expect 
parties to adopt a consensus rule for the activation of the CRM” 
 
5.1.4 Resource availability costs 
Since our study specifically examines the adoption of conflict resolution in 
transboundary water agreements, we need to consider the costs attached to the 
management of common pool resources. For example, when countries are water poor, 
the risk of conflict between them is assumed to increase (Homer-Dixon, 1999; Dinar 
et al., 2007), eventually stimulating the adoption of CRM. The continuous risk of 
conflict would also stimulate the choice for institutionalised and mature CRM. Yet, an 
opposite thesis7 argues that resource scarcity may induce cooperation instead of 
conflict, generating relations of trust and decreasing the perceived need of states top 
adopt CRM. Finally, Dinar (2006) found that the likelihood of cooperation increases 
when scarcity grows, until scarcity goes beyond a certain level, where it will be 
responsible for a reduced incentive to cooperate. This means that scarcity might be a 
necessary condition for cooperation to take place, but not a sufficient one. 
Considering this U-shaped relation, our study will only take dyads that face either 
high scarcity or low scarcity into consideration8.  
                                                
7 Since water is crucial for the economic well-being of a state and places parties in 
interdependent positions, ultimately enhancing the will to negotiate an agreement which 
will allow for an efficient exploitation of the resource. 
8 Data on water scarcity is obtained through the Water Poverty Indexof the Earthtrends database (data 
from 1980 until 2002) 
Hypothesis 5: “The higher the water poverty, the higher the resource availability cost, 
hence the more we expect a high number of CRM per treaty and the mechanisms to be 
more mature and institutionalised”  
Also adaptive capacity can affect this cost. We measure this proxy by using the 
Human Development Index (UNDP), which looks at the average of life expectancy, 
education and GDP and provides data from 1980 up to 2007. The reasoning is that 
states with high adaptive capacity can more easily provide alternative solutions to 
water scarcity problems and as such avoid the risk of conflict over resource use. In 
short, they are believed to be able to adapt easier to changing circumstances than 
states with low adaptive capacity. As such, they perceive less need of conflict 
resolution. 
Hypothesis 6: “The higher the adaptive capacity of parties, the less CRM per treaty 
we expect”   
 
In the same line, external resource dependency can influence at the operation costs of 
conflict resolution. Aquastat (FAO) provides data on water resources from +-1960 to 
2007. A country with a dependency rate equal to 0% does not receive any water from 
neighbouring countries and is therefore less likely to adopt well - developed conflict 
resolution mechanisms. Our hypothesis is therefore as follows: 
Hypothesis 7: “ When both countries are highly dependent on external resources, we 





5.2 Monitoring and Enforcement Costs 
If it were possible for parties to envision all future contingencies, reach prior 
agreement about how they should be handled and develop enforceable mechanisms, 
all transaction costs involved would be expended prior to the agreement (Ostrom et 
al., 1993). But since these conditions are rarely met, ex post transaction costs or 
continuing costs nearly always occur (Furubotn and Richter, 2000). Because both 
costs usually occur together9, we will further discuss them as such.  
The main reason these costs arise is because of the need to monitor the agreed upon 
mechanisms (Furubotn and Richter, 2000) and to ensure the parties fulfil their 
exchange obligations (Maitland et al., 2009). Four proxies (the level of trust, the 
compatibility of political systems, adaptive capacity and external resource 
dependency) allow us to assess the monitoring and enforcement costs. 
Furubotn and Richter (2000) argue that the biggest saving of this cost type can be 
achieved through decentralisation. Since democratic governance systems are 
characterised by an enhanced level of decentralisation10, we expect them to adopt less 
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. In the same line, it is generally agreed upon 
that parties with trustful relations face lower enforcement costs over time, as uniform 
ideas exist about implementation procedures and the nature of fair solutions to dispute 
(Furubotn and Richter, 2000; Ostrom, 2005). Ultimately, we expect the possibility to 
encounter monitoring and enforcement mechanisms higher when structures for 
conflict resolution are institutionalised, as is the case with commissions, permanent 
tribunals and domestic or international courts. Table 3 summarises the theoretical 
framework of our study. 
                                                
9 Appropriate enforcement, for example, also requires monitoring activities, which will at 
its turn induce a cost (Furubotn and Richter, 2000). 
 
10 The opposite applies for autocracies, which are usually characterised by a high level of centralisation 
Hypothesis 9: “The more parties are democratic, the more the monitoring and 
enforcement costs decrease, the less we expect a monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms” 
Hypothesis 10: “The higher the level of trust between parties, the more the 
enforcement costs decrease, hence the less we expect an enforcement mechanism” 
Hypothesis 11: “The more CRM is institutionalised, the more we expect a monitoring 
and enforcement mechanism”  
Table 3: Theoretical Framework 
TRANSACTION COST 
TYPE 
INDICATORS UNIT OF 
MEASUREMENT 
HYPOTHESES 
1. POLITICAL COSTS 
1.1 Uncertainty Number of signatories Bilateral, Multilateral 1. The higher the number of 
parties, the more likely a treaty will 
be associated with higher 
uncertainty costs, hence with a high 
number of CRM and more 
institutionalised forms of CRM 
1.2 Bargaining Compatibility of political 
systems 
Political system (democracy, 
autocracy) 
2a. When signatories are more 
democratic, we expect lower 
bargaining costs and hence a lower 
number of CRM per treaty together 
with more negotiation and 
meditation  
2b. When signatories are politically 
incompatible, we expect a higher 
number of CRM per treaty 
 Level of trust History of conflict and 
diplomatic representation 
3. The higher the level of trust 
between parties, the lower the 
bargaining costs, hence we expect 
an immature CRM 
1.3 Sovereignty Level of trust History of conflict and 
diplomatic representation 
4a. The higher the level of trust, the 
more we expect the CRM to be 
negotiation and mediation. 
4b. The lower the level of trust 
between the parties, the more we 
expect them to adopt a consensus 
rule for the activation of CRM 
1.4 Resource availability 
costs 
Water availability  Water poverty index 5. The higher the water poverty, the 
higher the resource availability 
costs, hence the more we expect a 
high number of CRM and 
mechanisms to be institutionalised 
and mature 
 Adaptive capacity Human development index 6. The higher the adaptive capacity, 
the less CRM per treaty we expect 
 External resource 
dependency 
Aquastat index  7. When both countries are highly 
dependent on external resources, 
we expect a higher number pf 
CRM per treaty, and we expect 
them to be institutionalised and 
mature 
2. MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT COSTS 
2.1 Monitoring and 
Enforcement 
Compatibility of political 
systems 
Political system (democracy 
– autocracy) 
8. The more parties are democratic, 
the more the monitoring and 
enforcement costs decrease, hence 
the less we expect a monitoring or 
enforcement mechanism 
 Level of trust History of conflict and 
diplomatic representation 
9. The higher the level of trust 
between parties, the more the 
enforcement costs decrease, hence 
the less we expect an enforcement 
mechanism 
 Institutionalisation of CRM Institutionalised form of 
CRM 
10. The more the CRM is 
institutionalised, the more we 




What follows are a few results, drawn from a first sample of 100 treaties. Of all 
agreements 55% contained mechanisms for conflict resolution, while 45% did not. 
The following table (4) shows the distribution among bilateral and multilateral 
agreements.  
Table 4. CRM presence in Bilateral and Multilateral agreements 
CRM presence Yes No 
Bilateral 51% 49% 
Multilateral 60% 40% 
 
Figure 5 displays the distribution of the different CRM-categories. In our sample, the 
majority of the mechanisms applied were negotiation (32%) and arbitration (31%). 





Table 6 shows us that the majority of our sample counts 2 mechanisms per agreement, 
while figure 7 shows the internal distribution of the mechanisms used. 
Table 6: Number of CRM per treaty 
Number of CRM per treaty % 
1 CRM 30% 
2 CRM 38% 
3 CRM 24% 
4 CRM 6% 
5 CRM 2% 
 
Figure 7: Distribution of CRM-type by number of mechanisms per treaty 
 
The above illustrates that when there are 2 mechanisms in an agreement, it is more 
likely that it concerns a combination of a soft law mechanism (negotiation) with a 











Figures 8 shows the distribution of conflict resolution by period, indicating an 
increase in mechanisms over time, while figure 9 shows the distribution by region, 
indicating the use of more hard law mechanisms in Africa, North America and 
Europe. The fact that the pattern of CRM-use in Africa is similar to the one in Europe, 
including the use of hard law mechanisms such as adjudication, could be due to 
interference of western colonial powers that drew up the bulk of the water agreements 
on the African continent. 
Figure 8: Presence of CRM by Period 
 
 
Figure 9: Distribution of CRM-type 
 
A last figure (10) illustrates that, while considered an important aspect of 
transboundary water agreements, most of the treaties do not specify who will carry 
the cost of the CRM in place.  
Figure 10: Cost-Sharing  
 
